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Abstract
We analyze the pass-through of cost changes to retail tariffs in the German electricity
market over the 2007–2014 period. We find an average pass-through rate of around
60%. This significantly varies with demand factors: while the pass-through rate to
baseline tariffs, where firms have greater market power because customers are less
willing to switch, is only 50%, it increases to 70% in the competitive segment of the
market. Although the pass-through rate of independent firms is significantly higher
than that of other firms in the competitive market segment, the extent of supply-side
heterogeneity is limited. Thus, the firms’ ability to exercise market power and reduce
pass-through appears to be constrained by competition and largely determined by
demand side factors. Finally, we find that the pass-through rate in the competitive
market segment has been approaching unity over the past years, indicating a rise in
competitive pressure.
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Oil and gas prices have been fluctuating over the past two decades, but started declining in
the 2010s. At the beginning of 2016 they reached their lowest value since 2003. Wholesale
energy prices followed a similar pattern in most European economies as well as the US
and, after a surge in the mid-2000s, are now at the level of the late 1990s. Yet, electricity re-
tail prices do not seem to have responded to these cost changes. Notwithstanding a decade
of liberalization and deregulation, as well as steadily increasing competitive pressure, Eu-
ropean retail tariffs have increased rapidly since 2000. In a 2014 report, the European
Commission finds that energy retail prices have increased by 4% annually across all mem-
ber states in the 2008-2012 period,1 and that the average increase in electricity retail prices
between 2008 and 2013 amounts to 28%.2 Over the same time period, German retail prices
increased on average by 36%, while network charges increased by only 17%, and wholesale
energy prices dropped by 27%.3
Understanding the extent to which cost changes are transmitted to retail prices for final
consumers – the pass-through – is imperative for policy makers; particularly in markets
that are the focus of public opinion, such as energy retail. Commentators regularly report
that the cost savings in wholesale markets are not passed on to consumers and that the
pass-through rate is very low.4 While several potential explanations are put forward in
the theoretical literature on the sources (and lack) of pass-through, empirical evidence to
answer these questions, especially in the context of electricity markets, remains scarce.
From a broader and more fundamental perspective, the literature stresses the need to
better understand the underlying economic mechanisms that explain the degree of pass-
through, which is – as pointed out by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) – a ’sufficient statistic’
for welfare analysis. Thus, estimating pass-through and its dimensions of heterogeneity
permits making inferences on structural parameters, which are normally unobservable
and difficult to estimate, such as elasticities and the extent of market power. These are key
to understanding the functioning of imperfectly competitive markets and are, therefore,
useful for counterfactual analysis and the guidance of policy interventions (e.g. Miller et
al. (2015), Miller et al. (2017)).
This paper provides an empirical analysis of cost pass-through in the German retail
market for electricity. Based on a detailed dataset of monthly electricity tariffs for different
consumption bundles at the postal code level over the 2007 to 2014 period, we study
1Energy prices and costs report, SWD(2014) 20 final/2.
2http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_price_statistics
3Calculated from Verivox, ene‘t and EEX data, see section 4.
4See, for example, The Economist, ’Switched Off’, February 13, 2016.
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how changes in main cost drivers – such as network charges, licence fees, and wholesale
electricity prices – are transmitted to retail tariffs. We find that the average pass-through
is incomplete at around 60%. However, there are some dimensions of heterogeneity. The
pass-through rate is lower in market segments where customers face higher switching
costs. Baseline tariffs – the tariffs that households automatically get if they are not willing
or able to switch retailers – respond less to cost shocks than the least expensive tariffs
available, i.e. the competitive segment of the market. However, even in the competitive
market segment pass-through is not complete. This might be due to long term supply
contracts and some degree of market power by regional retailers.
We also find that the pass-through rate does not strongly depend on the identity of re-
tailers. We contrast large vertically integrated firms, municipal utilities, firms with a mixed
ownership structure, and small independent retailers. The independent firms, which we
assume to be most competitive, exhibit 15-20% higher pass-through rates in the compet-
itive market segment; the pass-through rates to baseline tariffs do not significantly differ
across firms. This indicates that the ability to exercise market power is predominantly
determined by demand side factors (consumer search and switching behavior) rather than
by supply side factors (scale and vertical integration of retailers).
Moreover, we find a significant degree of time variation in pass-through rates. While
pass-through to baseline tariffs remains relatively stable, pass-through to competitive tar-
iffs is relatively low at the beginning of the sample period and increases to almost unity
in the 2012–2014 period. It therefore seems that competitive pressure is increasing in the
more competitive market segment.
We focus on the retail electricity market in Germany for several reasons. First, retail
energy markets, such as electricity and gas, have been in the spotlight in all major devel-
oped countries during the last decades, especially in Europe. Yet, in contrast to sectors
like telecommunications, the liberalization, privatization, restructuring, and deregulation
of energy markets spurred by EU Commission directive do not appear to have been fully
successful.5 While almost all European countries have reached the stated objective of fully
liberalized retail markets and entry has occurred on a large scale, direct benefits to con-
sumers in terms of lower prices and better services do not seem to have fully materialized
(e.g., Waddams Price (2005), Joskow et al. (2008), Su (2015)).
A second reason to focus on the German retail electricity market is data availability and
reach. We are able to match several sources, ultimately creating a rich data-set with precise
and high frequency (monthly data for eight years) postal code level information on retail
tariffs as well as network charges. Moreover, we have data on wholesale electricity prices
5See Directive 96/92/EC.
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from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) – the leading centralized market for electricity
located in Germany. These data are not easily available for other countries.
A further advantage of focusing on electricity retail markets is that network charges
and wholesale electricity prices account for more than 2/3 of the cost of electricity, while
the remaining third comprises mostly taxes and fees (especially renewable surcharges),
which can easily be captured by fixed effects. Moreover, most of these cost drivers can be
considered to be exogenous to the retailers’ pricing decisions. Therefore, we believe we are
able to provide unbiased estimates of pass-through rates because we capture a substantial
fraction of overall variable costs and can control for most of the unobserved ones.
Finally, electricity markets exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity in market structure
both on the supply and on the demand side, which we exploit econometrically. On the
supply side, we observe firms of different sizes and ownership structures, pursuing differ-
ent objectives. On the demand side, consumers differ with respect to their consumption
patterns and their willingness or ability to switch suppliers.6 These dimensions of hetero-
geneity are key to go beyond the estimation of average pass-through rates and thus help
to understand the sources of pass-through.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical framework and sum-
marizes the related literature. Section 3 describes the functioning of the German electricity
market. We describe the data in Section 4. Section 5 presents the econometric model,
proposes a pricing equation for the German wholesale electricity market and discusses
our identification strategy. The results on average and heterogeneous pass-through are
presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework and related literature
The literature on pass-through is quite extensive. The seminal theoretical papers by Bulow
and Pfleiderer (1983) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), further generalized by Weyl and
Fabinger (2013), stress that pass-through rates depend on the extent of market power –
both upstream and downstream – and demand curvatures. Specifically, Weyl and Fabinger
(2013) show that, under imperfect competition, pass-through is not only determined by
the elasticities of supply and demand but also by the curvature of demand. They present
several models of competition and derive the pass-through rate in each of them. In the
6Hortaçsu et al. (2017) document robust evidence of consumer inertia in the Texas residential electricity
market, due to limited search and strong brand loyalty to the incumbent. Similarly, Gugler et al. (2016)
document substantial differences in search intensity among German customers in electricity retail mar-
kets. They show that heterogeneous search costs affect prices and find an inverted-U relationship between
consumer information and price dispersion.
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symmetric oligopoly model, the pass-through rate derived from the firms’ maximization







where θ is a conjectural variation parameter measuring the intensity of competition
(θ = 0 represents perfect competition and θ = 1 monopoly), eD, eS, eθ , and ems measure
the elasticity of demand, supply, conduct, and marginal consumers surplus to changes
in quantity, respectively. The latter term ems measures the (inverse of the) curvature of
demand and it is positive if demand is log-concave as typically assumed in the literature.7
While the degree of pass-through is ultimately determined by the interaction of these
structural parameters, the general intuition is that the transmission of cost shocks to retail
prices in oligopolistic markets is incomplete, increases with the degree of competition
as well as demand and supply elasticities, and tends to unity in perfectly competitive
markets.8
Several empirical papers confirm that markup adjustments are an important determi-
nant of incomplete pass-through and propose possible mechanisms. Among others, the
following explanations are proposed in the industrial organization and trade literatures:
price rigidities (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2012; Nakamura and
Zerom, 2010), long-term contracts (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000), markup adjustments
along the supply distribution chain (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; Goldberg and Ver-
boven, 2001; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010; Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010), as well as
nonlinear pricing and vertical restraints (Bonnet et al., 2013). Moreover, recent empirical
studies look at the issue of incidence, i.e. how changes in production costs affect consumer
versus producer surplus (e.g. De Loecker et al. (2016) and Ganapati et al. (2017)). They
show that relaxing the assumption of complete pass-through in imperfectly competitive
markets leads to measuring a significantly lower burden for consumer due to increasing
costs than conventional methods would assume.
Most of these studies use structural models to recover mark-ups and pass-through rates
and explicitly model the mechanisms that explain incomplete pass-through. The main
reason for the use of structural models is that costs are rarely observed by the researcher
7Ten Kate and Gunner (2005) use a Nash-Cournot oligopoly model and show that, with linear demand and
constant marginal cost, the pass-through is independent of price elasticity of demand and that it decreases
with competition.
8The result on convergence depends on the other structural parameters. Specifically, under certain conditions
on the curvature of demand, pass-through can be larger than one and convergence to unity can occur from
above or below (Miller et al., 2017).
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and, thus, need to be estimated. Moreover, the estimated parameters can be used to sim-
ulate counterfactual policy scenarios. Yet, there is also a growing literature using reduced
form approaches, which are particularly useful when a large fraction of costs is observable
or when researchers are unwilling to impose a particular structure to the model.9 For in-
stance, Deltas (2008) studies asymmetric pass-through in the US retail gasoline market and
finds that prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than decreases. This asymmet-
ric response, as well as the speed of adjustment, are shown to be a consequence of retail
market power. Miller et al. (2017) study the pass-through of industry-wide cost changes to
downstream cement prices. In contrast to most other studies, they find that pass-through
is more than complete, i.e. it exceeds 100%, and that it is largely unaffected by the degree
of competition. By combining their estimates with estimates of other key parameters (de-
mand elasticity and margins) from external sources and using the framework of Weyl and
Fabinger (2013), they then evaluate counterfactual policy scenarios.
While most of these papers focus on markets such as grocery goods, petroleum, cement,
or automotive retail, the analysis of energy markets is surprisingly scarce. Few studies look
at wholesale electricity prices. For instance, Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008) use
time series methods and find that cost pass-through between EU emissions allowances and
electricity future prices in Germany is incomplete and asymmetric: positive cost shocks
are transmitted more strongly and/or quickly to the final prices than negative cost shocks.
Fabra and Reguant (2014) find that emissions costs are almost fully passed through to
electricity prices. Their explanation based on a structural model is that firms have weak
incentives for markup adjustment due to the very limited elasticity of demand in wholesale
electricity markets. The only study we are aware of to examine pass-through to retail
tariffs is Mirza and Bergland (2012), who use time series data to estimate the pass-through
of wholesale price changes to variable price contracts in Norway. They estimate a partial
adjustment model and find asymmetry in price transmission in the sense that positive
price shocks are passed on more quickly than negative ones.
Our study is therefore the first to estimate cost pass-through to electricity retail prices
using a large and disaggregated panel dataset including both price and cost data, as well
as distinguishing several dimensions of heterogeneity in pass-through rates. This latter
contribution is particularly useful as our estimates allow us to better understand the mech-
anisms behind cost pass-through.
9While reduced-form approaches can be criticized for delivering potentially biased estimates of pass-through,
MacKay et al. (2014) show under which conditions it is possible to obtain consistent estimates.
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3 The German electricity market
The German market is characterized by a vertical structure comprising a generation seg-
ment, a wholesale market, and retail markets (see figure 1). The transmission network
ensures that energy generated or imported is delivered to regional supply companies,
which then distribute it via low or medium voltage distribution networks to energy re-
tailers and final customers. Finally, a parallel balancing market ensures that the necessary
voltage is maintained in the network at any given time.
Insert Figure 1 here
The generation segment in Germany is dominated by three vertically integrated, al-
though legally unbundled, utilities: E.ON, RWE, and Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW).
Moreover, a fourth strong vertically integrated player, the Swedish firm Vattenfall, entered
the market in 2002. They jointly meet 2/3 - 3/4 of the total German electricity demand.
The remaining German energy needs are covered through local production by a large
number of municipal providers, other smaller producers, and imports from abroad. In the
wholesale market, most of the electricity generated is either passed on internally to the
retail outlets of the vertically integrated producers or sold to other retailers. Since 2002,
the German wholesale energy market has been at least partially determined through the
EEX located in Leipzig.
Although the percentage of energy trade covered through the EEX has increased,10 most
energy trade between wholesalers and retailers in Germany still occurs through over-the-
counter (OTC) long-term bilateral contracts. Yet, the EEX price can be considered a ref-
erence price, as it represents the opportunity cost of not using the central market. The
German competition authority – the Bundeskartellamt – characterized market conduct in
wholesale electricity markets in the late 2000s by joint dominance of the four aforemen-
tioned big players (Bundeskartellamt, 2011). These companies are also the main players in
the retail market and, although legally unbundled, still own parts of the network.
The German retail energy market is fairly concentrated as well, with the big-four utilities
covering almost half of national demand. In 2004, the European Commission noted (Case
No COMP/M.4110 - E.ON / ENDESA pg. 10): "In the market for retail supply to small
customers E.ON leads ([5-15 per cent]), followed by RWE ([5-15 per cent]), and RWE and
EnBW [sic, should read: EnBW and Vattenfall] with [<10 per cent] and [<10 per cent]
respectively. Other companies, including EWE and RheinEnergie, collectively represent
10For instance, Ockenfels et al. (2008) report that only 15% of energy consumption was traded at the EEX in
2008. A 2013 EEX press release mentions that the share of EEX in the German market rose to 20% (EEX,
2013) and in 2015 increased further up to 30% (EEX, 2015).
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[55-65 per cent] of this market." Although there were some dynamics in the evolution of
national market shares of the main players during the 2000s, the overall picture did not
substantially change. All big players lost some market share over time, yet they continue
to cover almost half of the national market.
This rather aggregated picture is partially misleading. Retail energy markets are re-
gional in scope, at least for what concerns households and small commercial customers.
In its 2009 monitoring report, the German regulator stated: "Geographically, the relevant
market for the supply of basic household costumers has to be defined at the level of the
coverage area – i.e., the low voltage network necessary to supply [energy]" (Bundesnet-
zagentur (2009, p. 77–79)). These regional markets, defined by the coverage areas, differ
substantially in terms of market structure, level of competition, and, accordingly, retail
prices. In particular, the four big upstream players are also downstream incumbents in
many regions.11
Several of the small vertically integrated providers (particularly the municipal providers)
are also incumbents in different regional markets, generally in the municipalities where
they operate. Figure 2 represents the geographical dispersion of incumbent types. While
municipal utility incumbents (green) are scattered all across Germany, RWE (light blue) is
mostly active in the eastern and western parts of the country. EnBW’s areas of incumbency
(navy) are mostly in the southwest, whereas Vattenfall’s activities (orange) are focused on
Berlin and Hamburg. E.ON (red) covers large regions of Germany, except in the western
part. Finally, areas served by independent providers (gray) and providers with mixed own-
ership structure (white; typically jointly owned by a big-four firm, and/or municipalities
and/or private investors) are scattered across Germany.
Insert Figure 2 here
While several retailers offer different tariffs in each of these regions, incumbent providers
are legally obliged to sell energy at a baseline tariff to all household customers who do not
explicitly choose another provider. Accordingly, this baseline tariff constitutes an upper
bound for the energy retail prices in a given region because it is automatically chosen by
customers unwilling or lacking the information to switch supplier. Consequently, incum-
bent providers have particularly high market power over these customers. Thus, baseline
tariffs should also be expected to be less responsive to changes in costs than those of-
fered by the competitive fringe to more informed customers with lower switching costs,
represented by the cheapest tariff offered in the market.
11According to German law, the incumbent is the firm that serves the majority of household costumers in a
local market at a given point in time. The incumbent provider is newly defined every three years.
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Although German electricity retail markets were liberalized in 1998 – which resulted in
substantial new entry – and each retailer has non-discriminatory access to all customers in
each regional market, German household customers show a great degree of inertia. The
German regulator reports that while customers had, on average, a choice of 97 providers in
each regional market in 2013, incumbent providers still served 79 percent of total house-
holds in German regional markets in 2014, 34 percent of which were still supplied at
the most expensive baseline tariff (Bundesnetzagentur, 2014). The number of households
switching providers has grown at an increasing rate over time, yet incumbent providers
have maintained a very strong customer base. In 2014, 3.6 million households switched
electricity providers, which accounts for less than 10% of all households in the country.
3.1 Retail price structure
The empirical analysis focuses on the evolution of retail prices, in particular on their re-
lationship with wholesale prices and network charges. Retail tariffs entail several compo-
nents. On the one hand, they are affected by electricity wholesale prices that constitute the
main essential input for retailers. On the other hand, they are also strongly influenced by
other factors, including the (regulated) cost of transmission and distribution, license fees,
as well as taxes and other fees.12 In its 2012 monitoring report (Bundesnetzagentur (2012)),
the German regulator discusses in depth the structure of retail tariffs for household cus-
tomers, whose national average composition for the 2006-2012 period is reported in figure
3.
Insert Figure 3 here
These average values are useful for understanding the various components of retail
tariffs. However, as discussed above, retail electricity markets are inherently regional,
as demand is localized at the level of the distribution network and supply also differs
regionally. Therefore, retail tariffs present a lot of cross-sectional variation across, as well as
time-series variation within regions. The German regulator reports that the cost of energy
purchase varies within different types of firms. Since 2007, entrants achieved, on average,
more favorable conditions, mostly because they buy energy from the wholesale markets
through shorter-term contracts and wholesale energy prices have decreased. There also
12One important component of retail electricity prices in Germany are surcharges for renewable energy. Since
2000, the Renewable Energy Sources Act guarantees a regulated feed-in tariff for renewables. This scheme
is funded by a surcharge on electricity consumers, which substantially increased over time from 0.78
ct/kWh in 2006 to 6.24 ct/kWh in 2014. This surcharge is nation-wide and is adjusted yearly. It is therefore
easy to control for it in our regressions via time fixed effects.
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appears to be substantial regional variation in electricity purchase and distribution costs
varying between less than 7.5 ct/kWh mostly in the north and center-east of Germany
to more than 9.5 ct/kWh in Central Germany (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010). Retail tariffs
are further influenced by network charges. On average, these decreased from 7.30 to 5.81
ct/kWh between 2006 and 2010 and then increased again during subsequent years. Even in
this case, there is quite substantial regional heterogeneity in the fees’ levels. For example,
the ratio of the 95th and the 5th percentile in the yearly distribution of network charges
ranges from 1.62 to 1.96 over the sample period, indicating substantial dispersion. Other
costs, such as the license fee, also exhibit significant regional differences, varying by over
75% across different states.
Finally, demand conditions are heterogeneous as well. Consumers’ behavior and, es-
pecially, their willingness or ability to switch supplier differ across regions. For instance,
customers living in urban areas have higher switching rates because they tend to be bet-
ter informed and face a larger set of available tariffs. Moreover, switching behavior tends
to be positively correlated with income, education, and other attributes, while vulnerable
customers tend to switch less often (e.g. Waddams Price et al. (2013), He and Reiner (2015),
and Hortaçsu et al. (2017)). The heterogeneity in energy purchase costs, network charges
and fees, consumer switching behavior, as well the different local competitive conditions
described above leads to significant retail price dispersion across local markets and, within
them, over time.
4 The data
The main data source for the analysis is the price comparison site Verivox, which provides
highly disaggregated data on energy retail prices, specifically, monthly price data between
January 2007 and August 2014 for 8,192 different postal codes (located in 6,205 cities across
all 16 German states) from 846 different incumbent providers and 316 different best-price
providers. For each postal code and month, we observe prices for three types of household
consumption (differentiated by yearly energy consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000
kWh) at the incumbent provider’s baseline tariff and the overall least expensive offer for
that particular regional market. Overall, we have 6 different prices for each postal code
and month, which we convert to e/mWh. The data-set thus includes up to ~4 million
observations. Due to some data limitations for the control variables and the inclusion of
lagged values, the actual estimation sample comprises 3,941,340 observations in total and
1,970,670 observations in the two tariff-specific sub-samples.
In Table 1, we present summary statistics on retail prices in the data-set. Average tariffs
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substantially vary both within and across consumer groups. The baseline tariff constitutes
the highest price in a given market. Therefore, we can infer the lower and upper bound of
the distribution of retail prices. These bounds are used to define price dispersion, which
we measure as the difference between most and least expensive tariffs in each postal code
and period. For example, over the entire sample period, the average lowest price per mWh
at 2,800 kWh per year was e188.10, while the average annual baseline tariff was e255.20.
Thus, e67.10 per mWh or more than 25% could have been saved by switching.
Insert Table 1 here
In Table 2, we report how frequently each firm type is observed as the incumbent retailer
and as the retailer with the best tariff. In most German postal codes (58%) the incumbent
provider is one of the big-four firms. Municipal providers make up 19% of incumbents,
while another 19% have a joint ownership structure. Only 3% of incumbents are indepen-
dent firms. This picture drastically changes when we instead consider how often each firm
offers the lowest tariff: 57% of least expensive tariffs are offered by independent retailers,
22% by the big-four firms –mostly through eprimo GmbH (owned by RWE), ’E wie ein-
fach GmbH’ (owned by EON) and Vattenfall– 11% by municipal utilities, and 9% by other
firms.
Insert Table 2 here
The data on the costs of purchasing and transmitting electricity are obtained from EEX
and ene‘t respectively. The data provider ene‘t publishes an in-depth database containing
the charges for transmitting energy through local German distribution networks. These
charges are structured as a two-part tariff: in addition to a yearly base price, energy retail-
ers also pay a variable price for the quantity of energy they transport through the network.
We aggregate these network-level data to the level of postal codes and calculate the total
cost per mWh of routing energy through distribution networks, depending on the con-
sumption level.13 The ene‘t data also include information on the license fees retailers pay
to municipalities for the right to install power lines and other infrastructure. To capture
energy wholesale prices we employ the Phelix current-price index provided by EEX, that
is, the cost of purchasing a mWh of energy deliverable in the current month.14 We aggre-
gate these cost factors (network charges, license fees, and wholesale energy) into a single
13The ene’t data are recorded at the network level and ene’t provides a mapping between networks and postal
codes. Networks often serve more than one postal code; conversely, several networks may be present in
the same postal code region. We follow the allocation of networks to postal codes proposed by e’net. The
mapping seems to work quite accurately as the empirical cost distribution is very similar independently
of which level – network or postal code – we look at.
14All our findings are robust to using month-ahead, quarter-ahead or half-year ahead wholesale prices instead.
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cost variable, indicating the per-mWh cost of providing energy. Note that while network
charges and license fees are postal code-specific, thus varying across regions and time,
wholesale prices are uniform across Germany and only vary over time.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of per-mWh-prices for different tariffs and costs over
the sample period. The incumbent baseline tariffs (figure 4, panel (a)) increase steadily
over the course of seven years from a price of roughly e 180 to around e 270, indicating a
price increase of almost 50% on average, with price adjustments happening mostly at the
beginning of each year. The 5th and 95th percentiles remain close to and stable around the
mean, suggesting that price dispersion of baseline tariffs is low and constant.
Plotting the best available energy prices over the sample period (figure 4, panel (b)), we
find no signs of an increasing trend: the price per mWh mostly remains in a narrow band
between e 140 and e 160, with a sharp drop in 2012 that is offset by an increase in 2013.
Finally, looking at the evolution of costs over time (figure 4, panel (c)) we see a significant
peak in 2008, while costs mostly remain in the range of e 110 to e 120 per mWh in the years
before and after.
Insert Figure 4 here
As discussed above, the heterogeneity in costs, demand, and competitive conditions at
the regional level leads to significant retail price dispersion across local markets. Figure 5
shows this geographical dispersion for one specific tariff – baseline tariff for a consumption
of 2,800 kWh – for one particular point in time – the year 2010. The different colors
represent the quartiles of the price distribution.
Insert Figure 5 here
We observe significant differences in the level of the baseline tariffs across regions. Base-
line tariffs are highest in the north-eastern part of Germany, where the price of consuming
one mWh of electricity lies in the (219, 264] interval in almost all regions. In the south-
eastern part, this cost range is substantially lower with almost all regions falling into the
[169, 210] interval. The west of Germany has more homogeneous prices, with most values
lying in the second and third quartile.
The baseline tariff offered by the local incumbent is always the most expensive tariff
in a given market, while the least expensive alternative tariffs are typically offered by
smaller competitors. In Figure 6, we report the within-network area price dispersion in
2010 calculated as the difference between the baseline tariff and the least expensive tariff
available in each postal code for a consumption level of 2,800 kWh per year. The different
colors represent the quartiles of the price-dispersion distribution.
12
Insert Figure 6 here
There is significant price dispersion in each area and significant cross-area differences
in the size of this dispersion. It varies between e26 (lowest value of the first quartile) and
e103 (highest value of the fourth quartile) by mWh consumed. This is quite substantial
given that the average baseline tariff (best) price for consumption of one mWh is around
e221 (e149).
Insert Table 3 here
Finally, we employ a large number of control variables at the postal code level, which
are also obtained from ene‘t. These include: the total population, the number of available
distribution grids, their total length, the capacity of energy transformers, the total number
of household connections (metering points), network losses in percent, cost of network
losses in e, as well as total energy transmitted. Table 3 contains summary statistics on
network charges, wholesale prices, and the control variables.
5 Model and estimation equation
The empirical model we apply to the data aims at estimating the pass-through rates of
network charges and wholesale prices on retail tariffs, while at the same time controlling
for local supply and demand conditions. Like Miller et al. (2017), we assume that regional
providers are free to set retail tariffs according to a pricing function that represents the
equilibrium strategy for a given consumer demand schedule in a competitive game. Retail
electricity contracts are horizontally differentiated, as each consumer can only purchase
energy from the local providers operating in their area of residence. Although electric-
ity is a rather homogeneous good, contracts are perceived by costumer to be vertically
differentiated, as the several tariffs of the different retailers in a given regional market
are offered under different conditions (length of the contract, conventionally produced or
’green’ electricity, bonuses, quality of service, etc.).
The price pi f rct of consuming one mWh of electricity under tariff i (incumbent base,
overall best), from firm f (municipal provider, big-four provider, independent provider,
other provider) in region r (postal code), at consumption level c (1,500, 2,800 or 4,000
kWh/year) in month t (January 2007 until August 2014) is therefore given by:
pi f rct = α+ ρcostrct + δXrt + τt + φ f + ηi + ζc + pir + ε irct (1)
where costrct is the aggregate cost (wholesale energy price, network charges and licence
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fees) of providing one mWh of electricity in region r for consumption bundle15 c in month
t: costrct = phelixt + networkrct + licence_ f eert, where all variables are in e/mWh. The
coefficient of the cost variable, ρ, measures the degree to which changes in costs are passed
on to retail prices.16
The matrix of controls Xrt accounts for time-varying differences across regions in de-
mand and supply conditions. Specifically, we control for the total population, the total
number of household connections, the number of available distribution grids, their total
length, the capacity of energy transformers, network losses in percent, cost of network
losses in e, as well as total energy transmitted.17
We also add a large set of fixed-effects. First, we include a full set of 92 month-specific
fixed-effects, τt. Second, we control for firm types φ f – municipal providers, big-four
providers, independent providers, and others. Third, we have fixed-effects for the different
tariffs’ types ηi. Fourth, we have three consumption basket dummies, ζc. Fifth, we control
for region-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity through a set of 8,192 postal
code dummies, pir. Finally, we run a specification where the month fixed effects, τt, are
replaced by month fixed effects at the state-level, τst. Thus, all 16 German states are allowed
to have independent time dynamics through the inclusion of 1,456 dummy variables. The
error term, ε irct, is a residual that summarizes unobservable factors. It is assumed to be
heteroskedastic and it is allowed to cluster at the level of individual electricity providers.18
We estimate equation 1 in four different specifications in order to allow for heterogeneity
in the pass-through coefficient of aggregate costs ρ. In a first step, we assume that ρ is com-
mon to all observations, thus reflecting the average pass-through of costs to retail prices in
15Network charges entail two components: a yearly fee per user independent of consumption and a variable
fee that is function of the consumed electricity. Therefore even though we calculate the network charge per
mWh, it differs across consumption bundles.
16It is not ex ante clear whether cost pass-through should occur instantaneously or with delay. Therefore,
we explored using different lags of the cost variable in the regressions. Since our findings remained
unchanged, we decided to use same-period costs. Furthermore, pass-through could by asymmetric in
the sense that cost increases are passed on to a larger extent or more quickly than cost decreases. We
investigated this using an error-correction model similar to the one used by Deltas (2008) and found little
to no evidence of asymmetric pass-through in the data.
17Several of these variables are expected to control for the cost to run the transmission and distribution
network. Germany adopted an incentive-based regulation in 2009 under which providers are incentivized
to cut costs. Network charges are, therefore, directly related to costs. Hence, the control variables mimic
the same factors used by the German regulator to determine the network charges.
18This level of clustering aims at capturing that many providers – especially the big four – mostly offer tariffs
that are homogenous across regions. However, as we discuss above, there are many other providers that
are only active in specific regions. Therefore as a robustness check, we clustered the standard errors also
at the regional level (postal codes or state-level) to account for these different correlation patterns. Results
remain unaffected.
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the whole sample. Second, we allow the pass-through to differ for the different tariffs ρi
as we expect the tariff types to target different costumer groups in terms of willingness or
ability to switch and, hence, capture different competitive segments of the market. There-
fore, we run separate regressions for different tariff types i. Third, we estimate firm-type
f specific pass-through rates so that we obtain separate pass-through rates for municipal,
big-four, independent, and other retailers as well as the different tariff types ρi f . Finally,
we investigate the evolution of the pass-through rate over time by estimating tariff, firm,
year-specific pass-through coefficients, ρi f t.
According to MacKay et al. (2014), there are two potential sources of bias in the reduced-
form estimation of pass-through, which we need to address in our setting. First, estimates
might be biased if the regression model is misspecified. This misspecification bias arises
from the skewness of the cost distribution and occurs if pass-through varies with costs.
This does not seem to be a crucial issue in our case. Our empirical cost distribution is
quite symmetric around the mean of 116.8 e/mWh, with a standard deviation of 13.91, a
skewness as low as 0.57, and a kurtosis of 3.35.19
The second type of bias – partial information bias – arises if the unobserved cost com-
ponents are not independent of the observed ones. In our setting, we measure the main
cost components, accounting for more than 2/3 of the cost of providing electricity. The
main unobserved cost components are taxes (which vary over time but not across regions)
and marketing expenditures (which vary mostly across regions). We believe to be able to
control for most unobserved cost components by using large sets of fixed effects as well as
including other cost drivers in the regressions. The former would capture time-invariant
regional specific differences, while the latter account for time-varying components that are
common across regions.
6 Results
In this section, we discuss the main regression results. Table 4 reports different specifica-
tions that focus on the average pass-through of costs to both incumbent tariffs and best
tariffs pooled. In the first column, we report the result of a simple linear regression of
retail prices on aggregate costs, finding an average pass-through rate of 36%: a e1 reduc-
tion in the cost of providing electricity to retail customers – for instance due to a change
in the cost of energy or the cost of transmission and distribution – is transformed in a 36
19Combining the numerical example presented by MacKay et al. (2014) with the moments of our empirical
cost distribution, we calculate the potential misspecification bias in our setting to be 2.4% at most.
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e-cent decrease in costumers’ prices, on average.20 In column (2), we add the matrix of
control variables Xrt. None of the control variables are significant in this specification and
pass-through decreases to 32%. The addition of month fixed-effects in column (3) signifi-
cantly increases the pass-through rate to 85%. Controlling for firm- and contract types in
columns (4) and (5) does not strongly affect cost pass-through. However, controlling for
contract type (incumbent or best-price provider) greatly increases the ability of the model
to explain variation in the dependent variable. This is due to the large difference in levels
between the respective time series and suggests the more disaggregated treatment pre-
sented below. Adding fixed-effects for the three different consumption levels (1,500, 2,800,
and 4,000 MWh p.a.) sharply decreases pass-through to 56%. Controlling for zip-code
specific effects (column 7) and, additionally, swapping month fixed-effects for month-state
fixed effects (column 8) does not strongly affect pass-through. In our preferred specifica-
tion in column (7), we estimate that 59% of costs are passed through to consumer prices.
For the interpretation of this result, it is important to go back to the specifics of the price
data. We observe prices posted for new customers, which do not necessarily coincide
with actual prices for current customers. Indeed, they can be seen as the best offer that
providers are willing to make at each point in time. Thus, posted prices should be expected
to adapt more quickly to the evolution of costs and market conditions than existing tariffs.
Therefore, we cautiously interpret this estimated pass-through as a sort of upper-bound to
the general pass-through in the German energy retail markets.
Insert Table 4 here
We next split the sample according to the two tariff types – ’incumbent base’ and ’overall
best’ – thus allowing us to estimate heterogeneous pass-through rates depending on the
customer types. As discussed above, these tariffs should reflect different segments of the
market. We expect customers who select into the ’best’ tariff to be better informed and
to have smaller switching costs. Therefore, these tariffs should be more competitive and
respond more strongly to changes in costs. Put differently, we expect the elasticity of
demand to be higher for these tariffs compared to baseline tariffs. Results are reported in
tables 5 and 6. The two specifications without fixed-effects (columns (1) and (2) in table 4)
are omitted for brevity.
The pattern of pass-through rates to incumbent base tariffs (table 5) is similar to the
one observed in the pooled sample, with the average pass-through rates being lower. In
20The small amount of variation explained by cost, i.e. the R2 of only 1.2% is due to the non-homogenous
nature of the two tariff types that are pooled here; running the same simple linear regression in the sample
of best tariffs results an R2 of 14%.
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the most comprehensive specifications (columns (4) and (5)) the rate of cost pass-through
amounts to 48 - 49%.
Insert Table 5 here
Conversely, pass-through rates appear to be significantly higher in the competitive seg-
ment (table 6). The cost coefficient remains large throughout all specifications and indi-
cates that 69-70% of costs are passed through to retail prices in columns (4) and (5). This
means that pass-through to competitive tariffs is higher than pass-through to incumbent
base tariffs by more than 20%.21 This is in line with the model by Weyl and Fabinger (2013)
summarized in section 2: other things equal, pass-through should increase with elasticity
of demand. While our specification captures the variation of baseline tariffs very well (R2
of up to 97%), it explains the variation of best tariffs to a lesser degree (R2 of 67-70%). This
is because the best tariff changes as the firm at the margin changes and, therefore, is much
more dispersed than the incumbent tariff.
Insert Table 6 here
In the next step, we allow the pass-through to vary across firm types in an effort to
analyze whether firms differ with respect to downstream market power. We would ex-
pect independent providers to have a higher pass-through rate than the ’big four’ utilities
and, potentially, the municipal providers, because the latter firm types are vertically inte-
grated with an established brand name that may grant them market power.22 Moreover,
independent firms generally buy energy from the wholesale markets through shorter-term
contracts (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010) and can therefore more easily adjust their retail prices
to changes in the cost of energy. Again, we distinguish between incumbent base tariffs and
best available tariffs. Table 7 reports the results on incumbent tariffs.
Insert Table 7 here
The patterns of cost pass-through to the incumbent tariffs of different firm types are
similar to those reported in table 5. The pass-through rate of independent firms is higher
than that of other firm types in all specifications, although the difference is not always
statistically significant: independent firms have a significantly higher pass-through than
21We also estimated pass-through to incumbent and best tariffs in a pooled regression, finding that the differ-
ence between the two is statistically significant.
22According to Gaudin (2016) the pass-through rate should also be affected by the relative bargaining power
between upstream producers and downstream retailers depending on the type agreement they contract
upon.
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municipalities in all specifications but column (3); their pass-through is significantly higher
than that of big four firms in columns (3) and (5), but not in the other specifications; finally,
there is no significant difference to firms in the ’other’ category in any specification. The
size of pass-through differences, based on the estimates from columns (4) and (5) of table
7, are modest at <10%.
In the more competitive market segment (table 8), we find that independent firms ex-
hibit the highest degree of pass-through in columns (2) to (5), with rates ranging from 74 to
90%. The differences to other firm types are significant in most cases, with the exceptions
of the differences to big four firms in columns (2) and (5). The differences in pass-through
rates are also economically significant, although not substantial: based on the estimates
from columns (4) and (5), independent firms transmit 12-23% more of cost changes to
retail prices than other firms do. Again, these results are consistent with the framework
proposed by Weyl and Fabinger (2013). Assuming that demand elasticities do not vary
across firms within a specific market segment (e.g. the competitive tariffs), the differences
in pass-through rates between independent operators and big-four incumbents can be ra-
tionalized by a larger elasticity of supply for the former. In light of the firm heterogeneities
discussed above, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Insert Table 8 here
To summarize, while we find some evidence for supply side heterogeneity, its extent
appears to be limited: the pass-through rate to baseline tariffs is quite similar across firms,
the pass-through rate to competitive tariffs is 12-23% higher for independent suppliers.
Therefore, the extent of pass-through seems to be mostly driven by demand side factors
– i.e., by the inability to switch supplier – rather than the structural characteristics of the
providers.
The next dimension of heterogeneity that we exploit in the econometric analysis is time.
In table 9 we report the results of specifications estimating a time-dependent pass-through
for the different tariffs. For the ’incumbent base’ tariff the pass-through rate does not
change strongly and remains in a 42-55% interval over time. Since the average rate esti-
mated in table 5 amounts to 49%, the time heterogeneity of pass-through to incumbent
tariffs appears to be limited. In contrast, the best tariff pass-through rate starts out at
around 40% at the beginning of the sample period, decreases to 32% in 2009, increases in
2010 and, after a dip in 2011, becomes almost unity for the final years in the sample. Thus,
the average pass-through rate to best tariffs of 70% estimated in table 6 hides rich time
dynamics: while the pass-through in the competitive segment is 21% higher on average,
the time-specific specification reveals that there is little difference in the beginning of the
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sample period, but that pass-through to best available tariffs is almost twice as high as
pass-through to base tariffs in the 2012 - 2014 period.
This result is particularly interesting as it suggests that after 2011, the pass-through rate
for the most competitive part of the market – the best tariff – is almost complete. In the
framework of Weyl and Fabinger (2013), this is consistent with almost perfect competition
in this segment of the market as pass-through tends to unity if competition increases.
Moreover knowing that the average pass-through in the competitive market segment is
incomplete (below one) and that pass-through tends to unity in the latest sample year,
can also help us identifying the curvature of demand. As pass-through convergence to
unity with increasing competition occurs from below, this would indicate that demand is
log-concave.
Yet we need to be cautious when interpreting the results on an almost complete pass-
through rate. As posted prices – which is what we observe – aim at attracting and poaching
new customers, they most likely are less sticky than actual prices and represent the best
deal an operators can offer at a given point in time. Thus in each period, we would expect
providers to price more aggressively in order to undercut the current best-price provider.
This is consistent with the patterns observed in the data: we see frequent changes in the
identity of the best-price provider and a large number of different providers across time.
This would explain why we observe increasing and almost complete pass-through for
the best tariffs in the latter part of our sample period. It, however, does not mean that
pass-through is as high for all customers in this segment of the market. Furthermore, given
that this adjustment process should be expected to be more pronounced the more intense
competition is, this logic would also explain the differential evolution of pass-through for
the baseline tariffs and best tariffs.
Insert Table 9 here
The final step of our empirical analysis is to allow a maximum amount of heterogeneity
in pass-through rates, which are estimated to be tariff, firm, and time-specific. Because of
the large amount of estimated coefficients, we present the results graphically in figures 7
and 8 for the baseline and best tariffs respectively.
Insert Figure 7 here
Insert Figure 8 here
While we see different evolutions of pass-through rates across tariffs, i.e. market seg-
ments, as before, we do not find significant differences across firm types. Thus, all types
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of firms in our data exhibit remarkably similar dynamics in their pass-through behavior
over time. While, in most time periods, independent firms tend to exhibit the highest
pass-through rates, the margin is not large. Again, these results seem to suggest that pass-
through is mostly driven by consumer behavior as represented by the different tariff types
rather than by firm characteristics.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the pass-through of cost shocks to household retail electricity tariffs
in Germany. We assemble a rich database containing nearly 4 million observations and
covering different retail tariffs for three types of household consumption (differentiated
by yearly energy consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) for more than 1,300
firms operating in 8,192 different postal codes between January 2007 and August 2014.
We have precise information on three major cost drivers for electricity retail prices – the
regulated network fee, wholesale electricity prices, and license fees – which combined
constitute more than two-thirds of the cost of providing electricity to household customers
and are able to control for most other cost factors through several time-varying drivers
and numerous fixed effects.
We find that pass-through is incomplete and, on average, amounts to around 60%. Yet,
we observe several dimensions of heterogeneity that are consistent with theoretical predic-
tions. Pass-through rates respond to different demand and supply elasticities as well as
competition levels. They are significantly larger for those segments of the markets where
demand is more elastic because consumers have lower switching costs and consider prod-
ucts to be less differentiated, while they are higher in market segments where the opposite
is true. The average pass-through of 60% decreases to around 50% for incumbent baseline
tariffs and increases to 70% for tariffs targeted at more mobile costumers. Moreover, pass-
through rates tend to be larger for independent retailers if compared to typical incumbent
retailers such as the municipal providers and the big four firms (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and
Vattenfall). The latter are expected to have more market power because they are larger,
vertically integrated, and have more established brand names that might serve as a lock-in
device for less mobile costumers. Moreover, they are expected to have lower supply-side
elasticity. However, the differences in pass-through rates across firm types appear to be
limited and are statistically significant mostly in the competitive market segment.
We also observe quite different time dynamics for the different tariff types. While the
pass-through to baseline tariffs remains relatively stable over time, the pass-through rate
to the best available tariff increases to almost unity over the same time period. Since 24%
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of German households have switched to the competitive market segment (Bundesnetza-
gentur, 2015), this increase in competition is likely to entail positive and significant welfare
effects. The differences across different firm types appear to be limited: while the changes
over time are substantial, the pass-through rates of different firm types tend to move in
tandem and are not significantly different from each other. Therefore, it appears that the
extent of local cost pass-through and, in turn, local market power is predominantly driven
by demand side factors, i.e. the ability of consumers to switch electricity provider.
We interpret our results in light of the general framework developed by Weyl and
Fabinger (2013). This is useful as it helps us to better identify which forces are at play,
thus explaining the large degree of heterogeneity of pass-through rates. In the context of
the German retail market, it appears that demand elasticity is a more important driver of
pass-through than supply side elasticity. This has clear policy implications, as it might be
possible to affect demand elasticity by creating policies that decrease consumers’ inertia
by reminding consumers of the benefit of switching suppliers or reducing the incumbents’
brand advantage (e.g. Hortaçsu et al. (2017)). Indeed, these kinds of policies are exten-
sively discussed and implemented in the UK (e.g. Waddams Price et al. (2013), ?). While
we think that our results and their interpretation are useful steps to better understand the
functioning of retail electricity markets, there is more that can be done. If we had reliable
external estimates for the other fundamental parameters of the model – such as demand
elasticity and conduct as in Miller et al. (2017) – we could go one step ahead and use our
pass-through estimates to run counterfactual simulations and evaluate policy scenarios.
For instance, we could analyze the effect of changes in the regulated distribution fees or
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: The Structure of the German Electricity Market
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Figure 2: Incumbents in regional retail markets in Germany in 2010
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox data.
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Figure 3: Development of Energy Purchase Prices – Weighted Averages over all Tariff Types
Source: Bundesnetzagentur (2012).
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Based on a yearly consumption of 2.8 mWh. Source: Calculations based on Verivox data.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity in Baseline Tariffs (2010)
Baseline tariff in e per mWh at 2,800 kWh yearly consumption.
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox data.
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Figure 6: Within-Network Price Dispersion (2010)
Difference between baseline and best-available tariff in e per mWh at 2,800 kWh yearly consumption.
Source: Own calculations based on Verivox data.
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Notes: The vertical bars indicate the 95% and 99% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates.
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Notes: The vertical bars indicate the 95% and 99% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates.
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Table 1: Prices and price dispersion by consumption, 2007 to 2013
1500 2800 4000
Incumbent base tariff 249.9 (32.42) 222.3 (30.81) 212.6 (30.44)
Overall best tariff 162.7 (18.27) 149.9 (14.11) 147.7 (13.28)
Price dispersion 87.19 (34.98) 72.37 (36.51) 64.95 (34.62)
Notes: All values in e per mWh. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2: Incumbent and best price frequencies






Table 3: Cost and control variable summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Network charge e/mWh 56.56 10.81 0.00 104.65
Concession fee e/mWh 14.89 3.53 0.00 23.90
Phelix current-month e/mWh 45.37 12.31 26.82 87.94
Population 13.81 2.18 0.00 15.85
Number of grids 15.00 6.59 6.00 72.00
Total grid length 8.87 2.49 0.00 11.57
Transformer capacity 7.26 2.10 0.00 12.67
Number of connections 12.57 2.75 0.00 15.37
Total energy transmitted 13.66 3.50 0.00 19.94
Network loss in % 2.40 1.74 0.00 65.95
Cost of network loss e/mWh 5.34 2.38 0.00 11.91
Notes: Population, grid length, capacity, connections and total energy trans-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Incumbent tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost 0.833∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.189) (0.124) (0.090) (0.062)
Population 0.168 0.000 0.047 0.215∗ 0.175
(0.348) (0.228) (0.232) (0.126) (0.120)
Number of grids -0.051 -0.057 -0.005 -0.096∗ -0.079∗
(0.071) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.044)
Total grid length -0.341 -0.808∗ -0.758∗∗ -0.125 0.135
(0.447) (0.420) (0.375) (0.312) (0.229)
Transformer capacity 0.172 0.084 -0.100 -0.927∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗
(0.553) (0.497) (0.494) (0.336) (0.282)
Number of connections 0.436∗∗ 0.547∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.222∗
(0.201) (0.246) (0.226) (0.147) (0.133)
Network loss in % 0.364 0.352 0.999∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.489) (0.479) (0.424) (0.158) (0.103)
Cost of network loss 0.027 0.005 -0.092 0.131 0.152
(0.262) (0.229) (0.210) (0.176) (0.114)
Total energy transmitted -0.145 -0.065 -0.111 -0.004 0.041
(0.271) (0.286) (0.199) (0.101) (0.059)
Observations 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670
R2 0.726 0.732 0.898 0.957 0.969
Month X X X X
Firm type X X X X
Consumption X X X
Zip-code X X
State/month X
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the provider level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 6: Best tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost 0.864∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.046) (0.058) (0.059)
Population -0.027 -0.032 0.006 0.118∗∗ 0.065
(0.057) (0.052) (0.044) (0.056) (0.044)
Number of grids -0.017 -0.018 0.003 0.001 -0.029∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017)
Total grid length -0.072 -0.080 -0.055 -0.180∗∗ -0.036
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.084) (0.064)
Transformer capacity -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.117 -0.035
(0.094) (0.093) (0.085) (0.114) (0.072)
Number of connections -0.087 -0.077 -0.075 -0.079 -0.036
(0.131) (0.132) (0.114) (0.106) (0.058)
Network loss in % 0.254∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.110) (0.068) (0.080) (0.049)
Cost of network loss -0.013 -0.013 -0.040 0.137 0.115∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.072) (0.063) (0.114) (0.042)
Total energy transmitted -0.059 -0.063 -0.073 -0.047 -0.077
(0.071) (0.071) (0.054) (0.062) (0.052)
Observations 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670
R2 0.579 0.581 0.645 0.666 0.695
Month X X X X
Firm type X X X X
Consumption X X X
Zip-code X X
State/month X
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the provider level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 7: Incumbent tariffs by firm-type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost*Municipal 0.780∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.112) (0.085) (0.082) (0.056)
Cost*Big-four 0.841∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.248) (0.157) (0.100) (0.077)
Cost*Independent 0.863∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.165) (0.127) (0.088) (0.069)
Cost*Other 0.858∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.155) (0.102) (0.094) (0.062)
Population 0.019 0.001 0.038 0.224∗ 0.183
(0.245) (0.218) (0.226) (0.125) (0.120)
Number of grids -0.053 -0.056 -0.009 -0.096∗ -0.080∗
(0.064) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.044)
Total grid length -0.801∗ -0.801∗ -0.747∗∗ -0.137 0.124
(0.412) (0.414) (0.369) (0.308) (0.230)
Transformer capacity 0.115 0.070 -0.134 -0.922∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗
(0.492) (0.491) (0.488) (0.342) (0.283)
Number of connections 0.533∗∗ 0.547∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.225∗
(0.241) (0.246) (0.226) (0.149) (0.132)
Network loss in % 0.352 0.368 1.020∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.479) (0.478) (0.425) (0.159) (0.102)
Cost of network loss 0.009 0.003 -0.107 0.129 0.149
(0.232) (0.237) (0.213) (0.176) (0.113)
Total energy transmitted -0.074 -0.064 -0.100 -0.004 0.042
(0.282) (0.296) (0.199) (0.102) (0.060)
Observations 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670
R2 0.732 0.733 0.899 0.957 0.969
Month X X X X
Firm type X X X X
Consumption X X X
Zip-code X X
State/month X
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the provider level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 8: Best tariffs by firm-type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cost*Municipal 0.866∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.056) (0.065) (0.066) (0.073)
Cost*Big-four 0.874∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.062) (0.053) (0.066) (0.080)
Cost*Independent 0.854∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.062) (0.052) (0.057) (0.060)
Cost*Other 0.855∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.053) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Population -0.031 -0.044 -0.007 0.098 0.054
(0.053) (0.054) (0.046) (0.061) (0.048)
Number of grids -0.018 -0.018 0.002 -0.002 -0.026
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.018)
Total grid length -0.079 -0.089∗ -0.062 -0.151∗ -0.014
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.085) (0.062)
Transformer capacity -0.002 0.017 0.014 -0.090 -0.059
(0.093) (0.095) (0.084) (0.112) (0.072)
Number of connections -0.078 -0.086 -0.079 -0.088 -0.036
(0.132) (0.132) (0.114) (0.107) (0.060)
Network loss in % 0.257∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.110) (0.117) (0.073) (0.080) (0.051)
Cost of network loss -0.012 -0.004 -0.033 0.143 0.111∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.063) (0.112) (0.043)
Total energy transmitted -0.063 -0.055 -0.067 -0.039 -0.063
(0.071) (0.072) (0.055) (0.062) (0.052)
Observations 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670 1970670
R2 0.581 0.584 0.648 0.669 0.697
Month X X X X
Firm type X X X X
Consumption X X X
Zip-code X X
State/month X
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the provider level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 9: Average pass-through of pooled costs by year
Incumbent base Overall Best
Cost * 2007 0.422∗∗∗ (0.153) 0.407∗∗∗ (0.104)
Cost * 2008 0.526∗∗∗ (0.110) 0.391∗∗∗ (0.082)
Cost * 2009 0.482∗∗∗ (0.119) 0.319∗∗∗ (0.085)
Cost * 2010 0.548∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.580∗∗∗ (0.114)
Cost * 2011 0.422∗∗∗ (0.099) 0.414∗∗∗ (0.091)
Cost * 2012 0.515∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.923∗∗∗ (0.063)
Cost * 2013 0.527∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.852∗∗∗ (0.037)
Cost * 2014 0.423∗∗∗ (0.134) 0.905∗∗∗ (0.047)
Population 0.198 (0.121) 0.029 (0.057)
Number of grids -0.098∗ (0.057) -0.021 (0.027)
Total grid length -0.109 (0.306) -0.098 (0.081)
Transformer capacity -0.942∗∗∗ (0.337) -0.004 (0.111)
Number of connections 0.528∗∗∗ (0.152) -0.054 (0.086)
Network loss in % 0.582∗∗∗ (0.150) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.080)
Cost of network loss 0.138 (0.159) 0.185∗ (0.103)




Firm type X X
Consumption X X
Zip-code X X
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the provider level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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